Growing evidence suggests that poor and minority communities are relatively more vulnerable to environmental pollution. We might expect a similar association between community characteristics and environmental enforcement, yet, empirical support had been inconsistent. An uneven government response to environmental justice concerns is perhaps not surprising given regulators' varying incentives to negotiate enforcement challenges. We argue that regulators confront two in particular. Regulators can pursue political enforcement, responding to those interests most mobilized, regardless of environmental risk, or they can pursue instrumental enforcement, responding to those communities most at environmental risk, regardless of political mobilization. To examine these competing strategies, we use an original dataset from the EPA's Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model to develop a geographic "riskscape" combined with census tract community data and facility-level enforcement data for our analysis. We find that state regulatory agencies pursue a mixture of instrumental and political enforcement but that these tactics are applied unevely across EJ communities. Poor and African American communities attract relatively higher regulatory attention, while Hispanic communities do not fare as well. Importantly, inattention to Hispanic communities is not mediated by the relative risk levels they face.
Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years, social scientists have devoted significant effort to identify and quantify the degree to which poor and minority communities in the United States experience disproportionate environmental burdens. This "environmental justice" (EJ) literature has become increasingly sophisticated, both theoretically and empirically, and there has accumulated considerable evidence of race-and class-based environmental burdens in facility location and exposure to pollution (Mohai and Bryant 1992 , Ringquist 2005 , Szasz and Meuser 1997 . Much less attention has been given to the question of whether there are systematic race-and/or class-based disparities in the enforcement of environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA). And, the evidence that does exist is mixed. Some research shows race-or class-disparities in regulatory actions such as compliance inspections and administrative sanctions for violations, while other studies find few such disparities (Dion, Lanoie and Laplante 1998, Gray and Shadbegian 2004; 2012 , Konisky 2009a , Konisky and Reenock 2013 , Scholz and Wang 2006 .
Although the findings are inconclusive, studies in the literature share the same basic research design. Researchers estimate regression models to isolate the independent effect of the racial, ethnic, and/or income composition of an area hosting a regulated entity (e.g., a power plant regulated by the Clean Air Act (CAA), a pulp and paper mill regulated by the Clean Water Act) on various regulatory actions of federal and/or state agencies. Negative correlations are taken as evidence of disparities-that is, that facilities located in places with more minority and/or low-income populations are less often the targets of government regulatory enforcement efforts.
These models do not reveal causal mechanisms, but they establish a pattern suggestive of disparities in government regulatory enforcement behavior. Researchers in this literature, however, typically do not make distinctions among minority and lower-income communities, and failure to do so may account, at least in part, for the varied findings. Specifically, some communities are more over-burdened from pollution risks than others, either due to hosting a disproportionate number of pollution facilities, because the facilities in their area are especially significant sources of pollution, or as the result of overall ambient environmental conditions. As such, statistical correlations between enforcement and demographic measures may disguise the importance of environmental risk.
Given limited enforcement resources, the Environmental Protection Agency and state agencies responsible for environmental regulatory enforcement must make decisions about how to allocate their effort. One might expect them to direct equal (and perhaps more) activities to poor and minority communities, in what can be referred to as political enforcement. The EPA, for example, has long had policies in place that ostensibly direct the agency to focus their enforcement efforts in this way (Konisky and Reenock 2015) , as do many states (Ringquist and Clark 2002) . Alternatively, because many poor and minority communities face additional hurdles in overcoming collective action problems, they may be less effective in pressuring government officials to pursue strong enforcement (Hamilton 1995, Konisky and Reenock 2013) . In this case, we would expect less enforcement in these communities. A third option is that government agencies may adopt an instrumental approach to enforcement, dedicating their limited resources to areas facing the most risk, regardless of their demographic composition.
We test these competing hypotheses using an original dataset that combines fine-grained geographic data on environmental risk, with census data on community demographics, and facility-level data on regulatory enforcement. Specifically, we use information from the EPA's Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model to develop a geographic "riskscape" (Abel 2008, Abel and White 2011, Ash and Fetter 2004, Morello-Frosch, Pastor and Sadd 2001) for the entire United States, which we then merge with demographic measures of the percentage of the neighborhood population that is African-American, Hispanic, and below the poverty line for each of the approximately 13,400 active, major air polluters regulated under the U.S. Clean Air Act between 2009 and 2011. We then estimate a series of regression models to evaluate the pattern of state government enforcement effort (i.e., compliance inspections, administrative sanctions for violations) at polluting facilities in minority and low-income areas (the bulk of CAA enforcement is done by state agencies, rather than the EPA). Controlling for other economic and political contextual factors, the analysis tests whether enforcement disparities are exacerbated or mitigated by underlying levels of community risk.
To summarize our central results, we find that state regulatory patterns are characterized by both instrumental and political responsiveness. State regulatory agencies dedicate greater regulatory attention to facilities located in areas characterized by relatively higher risk and in this respect their response is instrumental. Yet, regulators are also sensitive to the political demands of different EJ communities. Our results suggest that facilities in poor and African American communities, perhaps as a response to 30 years of an active EJ movement, attract relatively higher regulatory attention. One community cuts against this pattern, however -Hispanics. We find that facilities in Hispanic communities not only are less likely to receive detection attention, in the form of inspections, but also are less likely to be punished for violations. Importantly, this lack of attention to Hispanic communties is not mediated by the relative level of risks that they face. Rather, regulatory activities of all forms are increasingly likely to fall off in the face of higher relatively risks.
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the existing literature on disparities in regulatory enforcement, and explain why interpretation of existing evidence on regulatory disparities is hampered by the failure to account for geographic variation in environmental risk. We then describe our approach, including the new data we bring to the questions at hand. We then describe our modeling strategy and results, and the conclude with the implications of our analysis for the environmental justice literature and for policy.
What Accounts for Uneven Environmental Justice Enforcement?
The lion's share of empirical research on environmental justice investigates the extent to which poor and minority communities disproportionately reside in places with unwanted land uses and higher than average levels of pollution. The decision on where to site a solid or hazardous waste disposal facility, a major source of air or water pollution, or another potential source of environmental risk requires the involvement of regulatory agencies, since firms must first obtain permits to develop such land uses. In this way, government officials have at least an indirect role in any observed class-or race-based disparities in facility siting, and scholars have long argued that government permitting often fails to seriously consider impacts on vulnerable populations (Gauna 2015, Lazarus and Tai 1999 , National Academy of Public Administration 2001). The government's role in shaping the geographic pattern of environmental (dis)amenities, however, entails far more than issuing permits.
Decisions regarding pollution standards can have significant implications for patterns of pollution, and the EPA, for example, historically has not considered the distributional implications of its standards, although there are some recent exceptions (Noonan 2015) . Permits therefore, even when issued, may not based on emissions standards that are sensitive to the disproportionate impacts of legally allowable emissions.
Government agencies also have the responsibility to assure compliance with the pollution limits mandated by permits. Thus, even if pollution standards in a permit are established in such a way that they do consider potential disproportionate impacts on poor and minority communities, emissions sources may violate these limits in face of lax enforcement. Past research has demonstrated that robust government enforcement is an important factor in firms' compliance decisions. Reviews of empirical work on regulatory enforcement have shown that compliance monitoring and penalties for noncompliance both deter violations and shorten the duration of such violations when they do occur (Gray and Shinshack 2011) , and the EPA and most state agencies have traditionally relied on deterrence strategies in carrying out major pollution control programs (Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003) .
Given the importance of regulatory enforcement, it is perhaps not surprising that scholars have begun to evaluate the degree to which there are class-and/or race disparities in government enforcement efforts. Environmental justice advocates have long argued that such disparities are rampant (Bryant 1995 , Bullard 1993 , Bullard and Johnson 2000 , Collin 1993 . 1 This recent focus on disparities in government enforcement has taken the literature in a new direction. In general, this work addresses two questions: (1) do government agencies, specifically the EPA and/or state agencies, perform fewer regulatory enforcement actions when the regulated source of pollution is located in a community with a large proportion of poor and minority residents; and (2) have enforcement disparities diminished as the result of federal and state policies put in place to redress environmental inequities? 2
Regarding the first question, existing research has come to mixed results. Several studies have found that inspections of facilities regulated under the CWA are less likely when the facilities are located in an area with a high percentage of poor (Konisky 2009a, Konisky and Schario 2010) or low-income populations (Earnhart 2004b; a, Helland 1998, Scholz and Wang 2006) . Other work 1 Some in the environmental justice advocacy community also argue that government enforcement should be part of a program of "corrective justice" -that is, an effort to redress past inequities (Kuehn 2000) .
2 There is a separate literature that has investigated outcomes from federal district court decisions to determine whether monetary penalties issued as part of cases are on average lower when the noncompliant facility is located in a poor and/or minority community. The most definitive study in this literature finds no such disparities (Ringquist 1998) .
shows a similar pattern for CAA facilities (Konisky and Reenock 2013) . Moreover, facilities in areas with large poor populations tend to be associated with fewer punitive enforcement measures under both the CAA and the CWA Shadbegian 2004, Konisky and Schario 2010) , although there are exceptions (Dion, Lanoie and Laplante 1998) . With respect to race and ethnicity, results are similarly mixed, with some showing a negative association between the percentage of African-American and Hispanic residents in an area and the likelihood of an inspection, and others finding little such evidence (Konisky 2009a , Konisky and Schario 2010 , Opp 2010 , Scholz and Wang 2006 , Spina 2015 . This pattern extends to punitive actions taken by agencies in response to firms' violations. One study found that CAA facilities located in high-percent minority areas were less likely to experience administrative orders compared to facilities in low-percent minority areas (Mennis 2005) , while other work has found that CWA facilities tend to be associated with more punitive actions when located in areas with more minorities Shadbegian 2012, Konisky and Schario 2010) .
The inconclusive results may be explained by any number of reasons, including differences in the programs and time periods studied to data measurement and statistical modeling strategies.
Moreover, even where the evidence does point to class-and race-based disparities in regulatory enforcement, these studies do not provide (nor do they claim to) direct evidence that regulatory officials are discriminating against EJ communities. Scholars in fact have put forward alternative explanations, most notably that poor and minority communities tend to have fewer political resources, which results in less ability to secure attention from government regulatory officials (Gray and Shadbegian 2012 , Hamilton 1995 , Hamilton and Viscusi 1999 , Konisky and Reenock 2013 .
From a policy standpoint, regulatory enforcement disparities suggest that the disproportionate impacts that some communities experience may be, at least in part, due to differential policy implementation. And, given that the EPA and many state governments have policies in place directing them to take into account environmental justice when setting enforcement priorities, these disparities suggest that such policies are ineffective. A small empirical literature has emerged to evaluate the degree to which environmental justice policies have resulted in changed enforcement patterns. At the federal level, these policy evaluations have focused specifically on whether the suite of policies put in place early in the Clinton Administration-the centerpiece of which was Executive Order 12898 issued in early 1994-resulted in the EPA and the state agencies it oversees performing more enforcement actions in poor and minority communities. Collectively, the empirical evidence from these studies provides little indication that government agencies ratcheted up activity in these communities in the years after the policy intervention; in fact, there is even some evidence of reduced effort in some communities (Konisky 2009b, Konisky and Reenock 2015) .
Interpreting the results of these policy evaluations, however, is less straightforward than it might first appear because of two assumptions implicit in these studies. First, there is an assumption about the nature of the baseline conditions, specifically that government agencies performed comparatively fewer enforcement actions in the period before corrective policies were put in place-that is, there was in fact a disparity in regulatory enforcement to be corrected in the first place. Although this certainly reflects the claims made by environmental justice advocates, such claims could very well reflect perception more than reality. 3 The second assumption is that more enforcement activity in vulnerable communities is a good indicator of policy success. There is some merit to this assumption, given the evidence that government compliance monitoring and punitive sanctions deters violations. However, the EPA and state administrative agencies responsible for implementing pollution control laws may be reluctant to dedicate their limited enforcement budget resources to communities based solely on their demographic characteristic. Although this approach may symbolically achieve environmental justice aims, it may not be an effective approach to managing environmental risks. Instead, they may opt for a more instrumental strategy that instead devotes their limited resources to communities experiencing the most such risks. Although communities with larger proportions of poor and minority residents tend to face higher risks, this is not the case for all such communities. 4 And, if regulatory officials are pursuing an instrumental approach focused on risk, simply looking at patterns across community demographics may not provide either a clear picture of disparities or a good measure of policy effectiveness.
To illustrate the nature of this inferential problem, consider the maps of the City of Chicago presented in Figure 1 A second thing to note is that major sources of air pollution are located in the census tracts with both large percentages of African-Americans and Hispanics, but in higher numbers in Hispanic tracts. In a typical study of of regulatory enforcement disparities, a researcher would analyze these data to estimate the correlation between government enforcement actions and these demographics.
A negative correlation would be taken as evidence that government agencies direct less enforcement effort to facilities located in places with higher proportions of minorities (or similarly, low-income populations). Such an approach, however, cannot differentiate the varying levels of environmental risk confronting different communities. Simply hosting a significant source of pollution, such as a major source of air pollution regulated by the CAA, is insufficient for this purpose because facilities present different risks depending on the amount and nature of their pollution, and the fact that the risks experienced by any given community likely are caused by other sources of pollution as well. Moreover, while past research shows that low-income and minority communities on average experience higher environmental risks, the actual nature of the risks may vary tremendously from one community to the next.
Our analysis resolves this problem by introducing separate data on environmental risk. To show the utility of incorporating risk data, consider the additional maps of Chicago displayed in Figure   2 . These versions show the same census tract and facility location information as before, but we have also added census tract-level information on environmental risk. These environmental risk data, derived from the EPA's RSEI model as we explain below, are relative risks scores (i.e., they are unit-less measures), such that higher values indicate an area experiencing higher levels of risk for air pollution. The smallest size triangle represents the value of half the median, the next size the median, the third size one standard deviation above the media, and largest size two standard deviations above the median.
Demographics for city of Chicago at the census tract level for both percent AfricanAmerican (left panel) and percent Hispanic (right panel). Major stationary air sources appear as red dots. Relative risk scores displayed as scaled triangles.
There are a couple of important items to take away from these maps. First, looking at the two maps together, the census tracts with highest levels of risk in the City of Chicago are those with the high percentages of African-Americans and Hispanics. Second, and critically important for the key questions addressed in this paper, there is considerable variation in the risks levels of census tracts with similar percentages of these minority groups. For example, census tracts with large percentages of African-Americans in the southern part of the city generally reside in areas with less environmental risk (often half the median) than census tracts with similar compositions of AfricanAmericans in the western part of the city. This fact underscore the importance of considering both demographic information and risk information in studies of regulatory disparities; considering just the former may lead to an incomplete understanding of the nature of government enforcement patterns, and incorrect interpretation of the factors that might be motivating government regulatory officials in their decisions about which facilities to target. It is to this task of unpacking the relationships among demographics, environmental risk, and enforcement patterns that we now turn.
Estimation Strategy
To examine regulatory enforcement patterns in poor and minority communities, we adopt the standard approach employed in previous research. We will examine associations between government enforcement actions and community characteristics. However, we improve upon this work by introducing fine-grained geographic data on environmental risk, which has not previously been used in this context. To conduct this analysis, we will require facility compliance data, demographic data, and environmental risk data at a low level of aggregation. We discuss each in turn below. As we note below, our data consist of 13,400 cases over a three year window (2009) (2010) (2011) . To accomodate this panel data structure, we estimate each of our models with fixed effects for state and year. We also allow for an AR1 within-panel error correlation structure to correct for time dependence within cases.
Data
The policy domain for our analysis is the federal CAA. percent African-American, percent Hispanic, and percent poverty to characterize vulnerable communities. Using data from the Census Bureau's 2010 decennial census, we used an areal apportionment method (Mohai and Saha 2006; , Konisky and Schario 2010 , Konisky and Reenock 2013 ) to create "neighborhood-level" measures of the demographic characteristics around each of the more than 13,400 major air sources in our sample. 5 Specifically we first locate each major air source in geographical space using latitude and longitude information from the EPA Facility Registry System. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software, we then construct a 1-mile circular "buffer" around each facility, and then intersect this buffer area with a geospatial map of U.S. census tracts. 6 This is illustrated for the major air sources in the City of Chicago in Figure 3 . The resulting intersections are then used as weights for each demographic attribute, where the weight is the proportion of each census unit contained within facility's 1-mile circular buffer. Then, using these weights, we compute a weighted average to measure the percentage of African-Americans, Hispanics, and people living below the federal poverty line that reside within one-mile of the facility. 7 The mean percentage of African-Americans, Hispanics, and individuals in poverty in our sample is 12.5% (standard deviation = 18.6), 13.3% (standard deviation = 18.2), begins with data from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), which is comprised of self-reported releases of designated pollutants to the air, water, and land by facilities covered by the program. 8
Because TRI data only include the level of releases, they do not reveal much information about environmental risk -that is, without knowing the toxicity of the chemicals released and the pattern of dispersion, one cannot infer anything meaningful about who is exposed and the degree of risk experienced.
The RSEI model incorporates this information, beginning with TRI releases as described above, and then by integrating information on the toxicity of the chemicals released, their fate and transport through the environment, the route and extent to which there is human exposure, and finally the number of people that are affected. The model then generates numerical values -unit-less, relative risk scores -that can be analyzed and compared at a variety of different levels, such as facilities, geographic regions, and industrial sectors (Environmental Protection Agency 2015b). 9
To compute these risk scores, the RSEI model analytically operates at a fine-grained resolution of geography. The model uses a geographic grid system for the United States composed of 810 meter by 810 meter cells, for each of which it estimates ambient concentrations of TRI pollutants. Then, adjusting for the toxicity of the chemical releases and making some standard assumptions about human exposure, the model generates a risk score for each 810 meter by 810 meter cell. The score then for a facility is produced by aggregating the scores for these individual grids for each facility, for up to 50km from the facility which the EPA has determined is necessary to fully capture the impacts of TRI pollutants (Environmental Protection Agency 2015b).
There are a couple of important points about these data to note. First, the facilities used by the RSEI model to create the relative risk scores are not the same as the major air sources in our sample. Although there is significant overlap, not all major air sources are TRI facilities, and vice versa. This does not create a problem for our analysis, however. The idea here is that state agencies make decisions about which facilities to target with enforcement based on the level of risk experienced by the community, regardless of the proportion of that risk is directed linked to the 8 The TRI was put in place as part of the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act. The law requires facilities in specified sectors (e.g., manufacturing, mining) to report their releases of toxic substances if they exceed a specific threshold. The program has been modified several times over the years to expand the chemicals included and to extend the reporting requirements to additional facilities.
9 More details on the RSEI model are available from the EPA at http://www2.epa.gov/rsei, and in additional technical guidance. facility in question. This is consistent with the approach recently employed at the federal level by the EPA in its enforcement targeting decisions.(Environmental Protection Agency 2015a) Second, RSEI generates relative risk scores, so they are only meaningful in comparison to themselves. Importantly, it should not be assumed that geographic areas with low scores experience no environmental risks from air pollution. The numerical values computed from the RSEI model, for example, do not account for exposure to criteria air pollution (e.g., particulate matter, ozone, etc.) or to pollutants generated from mobiles sources. In our statistical analysis, we use the logged value of the risk score because of the extreme right skewed distribution of the risk scores. The mean relative risk score in our sample is 0.269 (standard deviation = .580) and ranges between 0 and 5.10.
In this analysis, we use the data computed for each individual 810 meter by 810 meter cell.
These micro data, provided to us by the EPA, offer an opportunity to measure neighborhood level risk at very small level of geography. Ash and Fetter (2004) do this for block groups in their analysis of exposure to pollution hazards among low income and minority neighborhoods. We do something similar here, with two distinctions. First, we use the areal apportionment method described above to create a neighborhood-level measure of environmental risk. Specifically, we first aggregate the risk score data to the census tract level, and then weight the scores using the proportion of the overall of the tract boundaries with the 1-mile circular buffer we create around each facility. In essence, we create a "riskscape" for the entire country, and then use it to construct the specific risk experienced by the neighborhood around each major source of air pollution. These data are then consistent with how we measure neighborhood demographics. Second, we use the risk data to test our hypotheses about the factors affecting state enforcement priorities. That is, we examine whether risk, both on its own and in combination with demographic attributes, are associated with regulatory enforcement actions. Figure 4 below displays box plots of the ln(risk scores) across each of our key EJ variables. As we would expect, Risk is monotonically increasing over each of our EJ variables: percent poverty, African American and Hispanic. Important to note, however, is that there is considerable variation in relative risk among the highest quartiles of each EJ characteristic, suggesting that the distribution of risk is rather lumpy within similar EJ communities.
Control Variables. In our regression models, we include a variety of control variables to guard against drawing invalid inferences. First, we include several additional demographic variables in- cluding total population (per 1000 people), the percentage of the population with at least a high school education, the percentage of the tract population with a college degree, and median household income, again all measured at the neighborhood level. These are measured using the same procedure as described above for the community demographic attributes. In addition, we control for possible heterogeneity across firms. We include controls for different types of major air polluters, by creating a series of dummy variables representing different industrial sectors: electric utilities, manufacturing, mining, and oil and gas. Our models also include measures of air pollution severity in the area in which the facility is located, in addition to economic and political conditions. To 
Results
We begin by estimating a traditional EJ model on our relevant regulatory outputs. In these models we consider whether different communities, based on demographics, attract differential attention by state regulatory officials on enforcement activity. This is because the analysis above reports average estimates across different EJ communities, absent any controls for relative risk score. Table 3 in the Appendix reports the models controlling for relative risk. After controlling for the level of relative risk in the community, the results for poor communities are relatively unchanged. However, the results for African American and Hispanic communities are quite different. Controlling for risk appears to have reduced the estimated effects for enforcement responses to African American communities. This is not necessarily negative news for those communities. It suggets that the regulatory activity observed above in African American communities may have been an artifact of not controlling for relative risk. State regulators are paying more attention to African American communities -because they are more exposed to risk.
The same cannot be said of Hispanic communities. Once we control for relative risk we see that facilities in Hispanic communities are less likely to receive enforcement attention.
We are, however, interested in whether EJ communities experiencing different relative risk scores attract different attention from state regulators. To examine this possibility, we estimate the effect of our EJ indicators conditional on the community's relative risk score. Table 4 in the Appendix below reports the results for this analysis.
The results in Table 4 , suggests that while communities with higher levels of relative risk attract greater attention from state regulators, this attention is uneven across EJ communities.
Our results suggest that facilities located in poor communities are more likely to receive attention from state regulators in punitive actions, yet they receive no different attention on inspections. It is important to note the impact of these results for vulnerable communities. While the population of facilities with African American or Hispanic communities is relatively small in these data, the population of citizens is not. Consider that the total number of communities with over 20%African American communties that live within 1-mile of the facilities in our data is 4.9 million across the U.S. For Hispanics, this number is 5.5 million. Therefore the impact on these potentially vulneragble communities is not negligible. outputs. While we cannot answer this directly with the data here, we do believe that one possible explanation is the legacy of the EJ movement. As we enter the fourth decade of the U.S. EJ movement, we must consider whether the differential treatment we observe in these data are perhaps counterintuitively related to the positive legacies of this movement. African American communities, particularly those with high numbers of low income residents, were the core of the movement's early years. It may well be the case that nearly 40 years on, the communities central to the movement's beginnings have begun to reap benefits of their advocacy. For example, according to one directory of environmental justice organizations, there are nearly 3 times as many organizations that primarily serve African-Americans compared to Hispanics (Center 2000) . Despite these gains, however, the Hispanic community has not been mobilized at similar levels on EJ issues. This may be due to a variety of reasons. First, Hispanic communities were incorporated relatively later in the EJ movement and as a result may have received less political attention over the decades. Second, and this reason is not independent of the first, members of the Hispanic community may have higher levels of distrust with state and federal institutions. The policy consequence of this distrust may be a lower level of perceived political mobilization and a resulting lower level of regulatory attention.
Of course, each of these potential reasons are merely suppositions. Absent data on mobilization we are unable to offer a precise diagnosis for what we observe with government inattention to Hispanic communities.
We believe, on the whole, our results offer a cautionary note on the use of economic and racial data as proxies for environmental risk. Our use of risk data allowed us to accurately characterize risk, independent of economic or racial community characteristics. As a result, we were able to differentiate between instrumental and political motivations behind regulatory inattentiveness. Absent the environmental risk data that we applied in the current analysis, we may have been tempted to conclude that the lack of regulatory attention to a given community was clear evidence of EJ bias or that regulatory attention necessarily implied greater environmental risk. Our findings suggest that the U.S. riskscape is more complicated than either of these relatively simplistic assessments of regulatory (in)attention. Note: Demographic data correspond to 1-mile radius circle centered on facility. 
